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Introduction: The Prospects and Risks of Peacemaking Referendums 
In 1975 the Bougainville Interim Provisional Government announced its intention to secede 
from Papua New Guinea (‘PNG’). Tensions escalated and took a dramatic turn in 1987-1988 
with the launch of an armed uprising by a group calling itself the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army. The PNG government deployed its armed forces to quell the unrest and Bougainville 
erupted into a civil war that has been called the largest conflict in the region since the Second 
World War.1 The war was finally brought to a close in 1998, followed by the signing of the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement (‘BPA’) in 2001. 
 
The BPA in turn led to the creation of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (‘ARB’). 
Under Part XIV of the PNG Constitution (amended as a result of the BPA), the ‘two 
governments’ of PNG and the ARB must together negotiate the details around the conduct of 
a referendum to resolve the region’s future political status. Negotiations are well underway, 
with an agreement having been reached on many procedural matters and 15 June 2019 set as 
the current target referendum date. 
 
Globally, the use of referendums in conflict societies has increased significantly in recent 
decades. They are normally held in the hope that ordinary people will give their consent to a 
new constitutional settlement and so pave the way for peace.2 Referendums have featured in 
efforts to settle conflicts in Colombia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East 
Timor, Eritrea, Iraq, Kenya, Montenegro, Northern Ireland, Somalia, South Sudan, Spain, 
Zanzibar and elsewhere. Referendums potentially help a conflict society to progress towards 
a peaceful resolution of its conflict even in the face of entrenched opposition by disgruntled 
                                                     
1 Volker Boege, ‘Peacebuilding and State Formation’ (2009) 21 Peace Review 30. 
2 Fernando Mendez and Micha Germann ‘Contested Sovereignty: Mapping Referendums on Sovereignty over 
Time and Space’ (2018) 48 (1) British Journal of Political Science 156-158; see also Matt Qvortrup, ‘The 
History of Ethno-National Referendums 1791-2011’ (2012) 18 (1) Nationalism and Ethic Conflict 129-150. 
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elites (including governmental, social, media, business, religious, ethnic and tribal leaders 
who may judge that they have much to lose by handing power of decision over to ordinary 
people). And, because they can enjoy broad social perceptions of democratic legitimacy, 
referendums may also help to ensure against subsequent breach of any settlement reached.  
 
These idealised assumptions help to explain the referendum’s global appeal as a tool of 
conflict settlement. Yet, in practice referendums have not always been beneficial. Some have 
even delayed settlement (as in Iraq since 2007 and in Colombia more recently). A host of 
risks arise. Most conflict-settlement referendums are still designed to be no more than 
rudimentary democratic exercises. While in theory they are meant to serve as a principled 
mechanism of democracy, ‘history suggests that short- and long-term political calculations 
have been the main motivations for holding them’.3 Consequently, in past cases, little 
institutional effort has gone toward improving the popular discourse leading up to the final 
vote. Standard referendum campaigns often merely amplify the voices of contending and 
entrenched political parties and elites. In a conflict society, where social polarisation is 
pronounced, referendums thus risk aggravating, rather than ameliorating, tensions.4 This risk 
should raise alarms as Bougainville proceeds toward its referendum.5 As the Bougainville 
Referendum Communications Committee itself notes, ‘violent conflict has occurred after 
independence referendums – for example in East Timor and South Sudan’.6 Even if violence 
does not occur, the spirit in which a referendum is conducted can have an important bearing 
on the spirit in which it is implemented. 
                                                     
3 Qvortrup, ‘The History of Ethno-National Referendums’, 129; Matt Qvortrup, ‘Introduction: Referendums, 
Democracy and Nationalism’ (2012) 18, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 6. 
4 Roger MacGinty, ‘Constitutional Referendums and Ethnonational Conflict: The Case of Northern 
Ireland’ (2003) 9 (1), Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 3. 
5 For instance, the referendum results could be ‘dishonoured’ by PNG, which would ‘heighten a sense of 
betrayal’: John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy and Leah Dunn, Reconciliation and 
Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville (ANU Press, 2010) 2. 
6 Bougainville Referendum Communications Committee, Joint Key Messages, No 2 Fact Sheet – June 2016, 3. 
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Our purpose in writing this article, therefore, is not to argue against the utility of the 
referendum, but to rescue the mechanism from its habitually poor design in conflict settings.7 
Research in deliberative democracy has yielded intriguing insights relevant to violent 
communal conflict. In broad terms, the objective of deliberative democracy here is to 
increase the likelihood that decisions will be based on a free and open exchange of reasons 
rather than on mere numerical superiority or the threat of force. Deliberative theorists take 
different views on what counts as an adequate reason.8 On one influential approach, the 
reasons that people give should be couched in terms of public values, that is, values that any 
reasonable person might reasonably be expected to endorse (e.g., freedom, equality, fairness, 
inclusion, respect etc.).9 This ‘public reason’ approach is not without its detractors. In 
particular, ‘difference democrats’ have criticised it for excluding private values (e.g., values 
associated with a specific religion, ideology or worldview) from the political domain.10 Yet, 
as far as conflict societies are concerned, there is at least one good reason why the approach 
should nevertheless be preferred. Reasons cast in terms of private values are likely to 
exacerbate conflict rather than reduce it. By contrast, reasons cast in terms of public values 
proceed from common ground. The public reason approach reminds people of what they 
share rather than of what divides them. Crucially, it can therefore facilitate the achievement 
                                                     
7 The Committee evidently shares this objective, being committed to learn from the ‘experience of other 
countries, and [to] do everything possible to minimise the chance of serious problems occurring’: Ibid. 
8 Dennis Thompson, ‘Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science’ (2008) 11 Annual 
Review of Political Science 497-520. 
9 Proponents of this ‘public reason’ approach include Joshua Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’ 
in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (eds), The Good Polity (Blackwell, 1989) 17-34; Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot be Avoided and What Should be Done 
about It (Belknap Press, 1996); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996);John 
Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) 94 University of Chicago Law Review 765-807. 
10 E.g., Iris Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000); see also Jane Mansbridge, 
‘Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System’ in Stephen Macedo (ed), Deliberative Politics (Oxford University 
Press, 1999); Lynn Sanders, ‘Against Deliberation’ (1997) 25(3) Political Theory 347-376. 
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of an ‘overlapping consensus’: areas of law and public policy where people can reach 
agreement, differing worldviews notwithstanding.11  
 
Given its concern for channelling disagreement into reasoned forms of persuasion, it is clear 
why deliberative democratic theory has forcefully entered the field of conflict research. By 
reworking institutions of decision-making we might incrementally improve the quality of 
deliberation, which in turn might improve prospects for the successful settlement of conflicts. 
‘Deliberative referendums’ are referendums designed specifically to improve the quality of 
public deliberation in the lead-up to popular voting.12 A recent work by one of the present 
authors explores the rationales and key design features of conflict-society deliberative 
referendums.13 In the ideal case, such referendums may help warring parties to reach the 
common ground (as described above) required for an enduring settlement—one that therefore 
is based on more than opportunism.  
 
Whether this optimistic view can be realised remains uncertain. In particular, the pathologies 
of standard referendums (ie, referendums in which deliberation is not expressly pursued and 
instituted as part of the overall process) are well-recognised, and in our view these must be 
explicitly addressed if any referendum is to be useful – and especially if a referendum is to 
avoid derailing efforts at subsequent settlement. The specific question we explore in this 
article is therefore what can be done to improve deliberation in the course of the Bougainville 
referendum. Even a marginal improvement in its deliberative quality may help to reconstruct 
                                                     
11 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971), 340; Rawls, Political Liberalism, above n 
9 134-149. 
12 See, eg, Ron Levy, ‘“Deliberative Voting”: Realising Constitutional Referendum Democracy’ (2013) Public 
Law 555; Stephen Tierney, ‘Using Electoral Law to Construct a Deliberative Referendum: Moving Beyond the 
Democratic Paradox’ (2013) 12(4) Election Law Journal 508.  
13 Ron Levy, ‘“Shotgun Referendums”: Popular Deliberation and Constitutional Settlement in Conflict 
Societies’ (2018) 41(3) Melbourne University Law Review (forthcoming). 
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the referendum from a potential destabilising factor (deepening rather than ameliorating 
divisions) to an effective peacebuilding tool (encouraging the search for common ground, 
final settlement, etc.). We explore here how a deliberative referendum might help to impel 
the Bougainville peace process toward successful resolution. We also consider the 
referendum’s hazards.  
 
In Part II we introduce the background to the Bougainville conflict, including specifics that 
make resolving this conflict particularly urgent. Here we also cover points of contention 
among the parties that may need to be addressed in any peace initiative. In Part III we outline 
the key impediments to deliberation in conflict societies generally, and in Bougainville more 
particularly. Then we turn to the role that a deliberative referendum could play in a process of 
conflict settlement by addressing such deliberative deficiencies: in Parts IV to VII, we 
describe the deliberative referendum model’s objectives and design features, and also suggest 
how the model could be deployed in the Bougainville case. If designed carefully, a 
deliberative referendum could potentially improve the upcoming referendum’s prospects of 
achieving a sustainable peace settlement in the longer run.  
 
The Bougainville Referendum: Background 
 
Brief History 
 
The Autonomous Region of Bougainville, situated in the Melanesian Pacific, is a small 
archipelago dominated by the largest island of Bougainville – though its provincial capital of 
6 
 
Buka is situated on the smaller Buka Island.14 Today the ARB is formally a part of PNG. 
From 1920, Australia was granted post-war international mandates to administer PNG, drawn 
to include Bougainville, and did so until PNG became independent in 1975. Bougainville was 
assigned the status of a province within the newly independent PNG. 
 
Coinciding with PNG’s independence, a secessionist movement arose on Bougainville. The 
history of this movement is interwoven with the history of mining on the island. Mining 
began on Bougainville in 1972, when Australian company Rio Tinto subsidiary Bougainville 
Copper Limited began extracting copper and gold at the Panguna Mine. Mining provoked a 
great deal of local unrest.15  
 
In 1975 the Bougainville Interim Provisional Government announced that it was seceding 
from PNG. This claimed secession did not garner international support or recognition and so 
the relationship to PNG underwent no major change.16 Tensions escalated with the noted 
launch of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (‘BRA’) uprising and the intervention of the 
PNG armed forces.17 The BRA’s stated aim was to halt mining at Panguna. There is 
widespread agreement that the commencement of mining at Panguna, in 1972, disrupted the 
social foundations of the island almost as deeply as had colonisation.18  
                                                     
14 Joanne Wallis, Constitution Making during State Building (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Braithwaite et 
al, above n 5, 9.  
15 Anthony Regan, ‘Identities among Bougainvilleans’ in Anthony Regan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
and Helga Griffin (eds), Bougainville before the Conflict (Pandanus Books, 2005) 440; Eliza Ginnivan, 
‘Mining, Law and War: Bougainville’s Legislative Gamble,’ 41 Asia Pacific 60.  
16 ‘Separatists in PNG,’ The Canberra Times (Canberra), 24 March 1975, 2; ‘Bougainville to Secede “on Sept 
1”’, The Canberra Times (Canberra), 4 August 1975, 1; ‘Secession in PNG’, The Canberra Times (Canberra), 5 
August 1975, 2; International Peace Academy, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and 
Grievance (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) 142. 
17 Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 23; Regan, above n 15, 484. 
18 While Bougainville’s referendum is not due to take place until next year, Mendez and Germann’s recent 
analysis suggests that it nevertheless ought to be viewed as belonging to a cluster of referendums that reached 
its peaked during the decolonisation period that immediately followed the Second World War. Though out-of-
sample, see, Mendez and Germann, ‘Contested Sovereignty’, 150-156. 
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In 1994 the PNG government lifted its blockade after a peace conference, though civil unrest 
persisted on Bougainville until a ceasefire agreement was reached in 1997. Media attention 
returned to the region with the 1997 ‘Sandline affair’, when it emerged that the PNG 
government was negotiating with a British private military company to supply mercenaries to 
assist in restoring PNG’s authority on Bougainville.19 Following pressure from Australia and 
other neighbouring countries, PNG abandoned the plan and the incumbent Prime Minister 
was ousted.  
 
Steps Towards Peace 
 
Also in 1997, and partly in response to the Sandline affair, New Zealand hosted a series of 
peace negotiations. The outcome of these talks was PNG’s agreement to an autonomous 
status for what would henceforth be called the ARB. The process culminated in the 2001 
signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement. The Agreement rests on ‘three pillars’: 
autonomous government, weapons disposal, and a commitment to a referendum on 
‘Bougainville’s future political status’ to be held no later than mid-2020.20 The generous time 
window allowed for the conduct of the referendum reflects the considered need for 
peacebuilding and weapons disposal ahead of the event, to maximise the chances of a 
peaceful transition.21 
                                                     
19 Mary Louise O’Callaghan, ‘PNG Hires Mercenaries to Blast Rebels’, The Weekend Australian, 22 February 
1997, 1, 8.  
20 Bougainville Peace Agreement, Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea–Bougainville 
Representatives, signed 30 August 2001.  
21 Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 57-63; Anthony Regan, Light Interventions: Lessons from Bougainville (United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2010) 93. See also Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 2004, 
s 15. As we know from other cases, there are dangers here as well. For example, article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi 
Constitution mandates a referendum on the administrative status of ‘disputed territories’ such as Kirkuk. The 
referendum was meant to be held in 2007 after the situation on the ground was ‘normalised’ and a census had 
been held. But what has happened instead is that Iraqi Shia politicians have, for reasons of their own, dragged 
their feet on normalization and census so that the referendum cannot be held. For an extended discussion, see 
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In line with the Agreement, a new Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 
was drafted between 2002 and 2004 by a representative Commission and adopted by the 
representative Bougainville Constituent Assembly in November 2004.22 Key elements of the 
Agreement were also incorporated into the PNG Constitution.23 The people of Bougainville 
elected the first President of the ARB in 2005, pursuant to their new Constitution.24  
 
 
Legal Provisions Governing the Referendum  
 
Part XIV of the PNG Constitution enshrines key terms of the BPA. Negotiations on the 
conduct of the referendum have involved the two governments of PNG and Bougainville, and 
the Joint Supervisory Body (‘JSB’), a constitutionally mandated forum comprising 
representatives of both governments.25 Negotiations are well underway, with agreement on 
many procedural matters having taken place, including a ‘Work-plan’ to guide progress 
towards the referendum. The JSB has set 15 June 2019 as a ‘target’ referendum date towards 
which all parties are working. The final date has not yet been settled, though, and unforeseen 
circumstances may require that an alternate date be chosen.26 
 
                                                     
Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
22 Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 2004 
<http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_CONSTITUTION_2004.pdf>. 
23 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, PART XIV 
<http://www.parliament.gov.pg/images/misc/PNG-CONSTITUTION.pdf>. 
24 Ibid, Part 25, ss 227-240. 
25 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, s 332 
<http://www.parliament.gov.pg/images/misc/PNG-CONSTITUTION.pdf>. 
26 Bougainville Referendum Communications Committee, Joint Key Messages, No 2 Fact Sheet – June 2016. 
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The Bougainville Constitution, while a lengthy and comprehensive blueprint for government, 
addresses the planned referendum only in providing for the possibility of a decision to 
abandon it. Such a decision would need to be taken within a specified time, endorsed by a 
supermajority within Bougainville’s legislature and then made the subject of ‘widespread 
consultation with the people’.27  
 
The provisions in the PNG Constitution dealing specifically with the conduct of the 
referendum, found in Division 7 of Part XIV, are quite general and leave much to future 
negotiation. The largely symbolic nature of this part of the Constitution is evident in, among 
others, s 341, which provides simply that ‘[t]he National Government and the Bougainville 
Government shall co-operate to ensure that the referendum is free and fair’. One of the few 
direct constraints imposed within Division 7 is a stipulation that one option presented at the 
referendum must be full independence for Bougainville.28 There is no stated limit to the 
number of options that may be presented (more on which later), but merely a requirement 
that the options be agreed between the two governments and be framed clearly so as to ‘avoid 
a disputed or unclear result’.29  
 
Division 7 provides very limited guidance as to what should happen in the aftermath of the 
referendum. It says simply that the two governments ‘shall consult over the results of the 
Referendum’, and that the National Parliament shall ‘take’ these results and inform the 
Bougainville Executive of its deliberations about ‘any decision made in the National 
Parliament regarding the Referendum’.30 A little less vague is the provision for the resolution 
                                                     
27 Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 2004, s 194. 
28 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, s 339(c) 
<http://www.parliament.gov.pg/images/misc/PNG-CONSTITUTION.pdf>. 
29 Ibid s 399(a)-(b). 
30 Ibid s 342(1)-(2). 
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of disputes arising between the two governments at any stage, with mandated mediation 
and/or arbitration in the first instance and only limited recourse to judicial review.31 During 
the Bougainville Peace Agreement negotiations, Bougainville advocated for the referendum 
to be binding. However, the referendum (strictly speaking a ‘plebiscite’) is not formally 
binding on PNG.32 Despite this, the international community might strongly object if PNG 
disregarded the results, similar to East Timor’s 1999 independence referendum.33 
 
Section 340 of the PNG Constitution anticipates that an ‘Organic Law’ – a PNG statute with 
a quasi-constitutional status – will make detailed provision for the referendum in relation to 
such things as polling places, the composition of electoral rolls, security and offences, and 
scrutiny and international observers.34 As this section of the Constitution dates from 2002, it 
in fact amounts to a post hoc recognition of the already existing Organic Law on Peace-
Building in Bougainville – Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville 
Referendum 2002 (‘the Organic Law’). 
 
The Organic Law is concerned with many different aspects of the administration of 
Bougainville, with the conduct of the Referendum being the focus of Part 4. It provides an 
additional layer of detail in relation to several key issues. For instance, it forbids the 
formalising of a referendum date until the two governments have agreed on ‘detailed criteria’ 
by which non-resident Bougainvillean eligible voters will be identified, the in-principle 
                                                     
31 Ibid ss 343, 333-336. 
32 Regan, above n 21, 89-90. In this respect, much may depend on how the vote is organised and, more 
especially, on the popular legitimacy that the process and outcome garners. If the referendum were to be 
explicitly organised along deliberative lines, it might take on a binding character just for that very reason. 
Ordinarily, referendums tend to be highly partisan and also highly flawed (more on which later), especially in 
terms of their deliberative quality, which in turn makes it possible for governments to reject their results when it 
does not serve their interests. A deliberative referendum, by contrast, reflects citizens’ reasoned views and 
should, for that reason, be harder to ignore. 
33 Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 57. 
34 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, s 340 
<http://www.parliament.gov.pg/images/misc/PNG-CONSTITUTION.pdf>. 
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entitlement of such a category of voters having proven central to securing the Peace 
Agreement.35 Part 4 also presents options for administering the referendum. From among a 
menu of options – including sole carriage by the PNG Electoral Commission, and sole 
carriage by the Bougainville Electoral authority – the JSB has, in consultation with those 
existing agencies, chosen the course of establishing a new independent agency with a 
mandate to ‘carry out its duties in an impartial manner’.36  
 
Considerations in Shaping the Referendum Process 
 
There are a number of obvious, and doubtless many less obvious, socio-political challenges 
facing the planners of the Bougainville referendum. Commentators who have undertaken 
grass-roots research into the prospects for enduring peace in Bougainville seem to be in broad 
agreement about many of the key challenges. These challenges, which are in many ways 
intertwined, include: overcoming fear and mistrust of government authority as the legacy of 
colonial exploitation; the experience of mining and prospects for its return; ethnic divisions 
and resentment of immigrants; and the potential for elite interests to distort the debate around 
independence.  
 
Historical experience has given Bougainvilleans many reasons to distrust outsiders and doubt 
their proposals and initiatives. The ‘blackbirding’ of Bougainvilleans – the recruitment of 
indentured plantation labour by force or through trickery – affected many generations during 
the 19th Century. While Germany established the first colonial government outpost in 1905, 
                                                     
35 Bougainville Peace Agreement, Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea–Bougainville 
Representatives, signed 30 August 2001, cl 315; Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville – Autonomous 
Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum 2002, s 55(1). 
36 Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville – Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville 
Referendum 2002, ss 56-60. 
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Bougainville soon after came under Australian control. The island’s experience of the Second 
World War was horrific and served to deepen local resentment towards the colonial overlords 
who had drawn the island into their conflict. That resentment is compounded by the  
grouping (dating back to German colonisation) of Bougainville with PNG for administrative 
purposes, rather than the locally preferred Solomon Islands.37  
 
Mining saw an influx of workers from mainland PNG and beyond, new money distributed in 
ways that undermined social structures, internal displacement and migration, and new 
problems including alcoholism and prostitution.38 These tensions and strains were primary 
drivers of the descent into armed conflict, with the most notorious armed faction – Francis 
Ona’s BRA – nominating the mine’s closure as its overriding demand.39 Even though no 
large scale mining has been permitted since Panguna’s forced closure in 1989,40 there 
remains a great deal of sensitivity around the subject and attitudes towards mining are likely 
to be critical determinants of voting patterns at referendum. Some commentators, along with 
many among Bougainville’s elite, believe that independence for Bougainville is unlikely to 
be financially sustainable without a return to large-scale mining on the island.41  
 
Another factor that will inevitably bear upon the design and conduct of a Bougainville 
referendum is the manner in which peacebuilding efforts have unfolded to date. The detailed 
study by Braithwaite et al. refers to this factor as the ‘architecture’ of peacebuilding and 
observes that, in Bougainville, a predominately ‘bottom up’ process has ensued, of village-
                                                     
37 Regan, above n 15, 418-421; Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 9. 
38 Boege, above n 1, 30. 
39 Timothy G Hammond, ‘Resolving Hybrid Conflicts: the Bougainville Story’ (2012) Foreign Policy Journal, 
4. 
40 Eliza Ginnivan, ‘Asia Pacific Mining, Law and War: Bougainville’s Legislative Gamble’ (2016) Alternative 
Law Journal 41, 60-62. 
41 Ibid; Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 128-9; Don Vernon, ‘The Panguna Mine’ in Anthony Regan and Helga 
Griffin (eds), Bougainville before the Conflict (Pandanus Books, 2005) 270-1; Hammond, above n 39, 8.  
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by-village brokering of truces and informing and educating.42 Especially influential in this 
process have been faith-based organisations – a long-standing and central pillar of 
Bougainvillian society and source of ongoing coordinated efforts to scaffold peace-building 
at the local level.43  Braithwaite et al, however, bemoan the relative absence of 
complimentary ‘top down’ peacebuilding efforts, in the form of regional multilateral dialogue 
about the conflict, its causes and contributors.44 They contend, further, that the PNG 
Government has done little to articulate the possible benefits for Bougainvilleans of 
remaining within PNG and that other regional governments have not applied any pressure for 
it to undertake this advocacy.45 
 
While those factors provide important background to inform the design of the referendum 
process, another source of valuable inputs may, we contend, be the existing literature on 
referendum design that has been produced by political scientists and lawyers.  
 
Impediments to Deliberation in Bougainville  
 
At least five characteristics of conflict societies can diminish the quality of popular and elite 
deliberation (and the interactions between the two). These characteristics, all of which 
manifest in Bougainville, might intensify during a referendum process. 
 
Social Division and Polarisation 
 
                                                     
42 Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 133.  
43  See, eg, ‘Churches meet for peace-building workshop’, PNG Post Courier, 8 March 2018 
<https://postcourier.com.pg/churches-meet-peace-building-workshop/> accessed 25 March 2018; Braithwaite et 
al, above n 2, 69-71; Joanna Wallis, Constitution-making during State Building (CUP, 2014), 259-60.  
44 Above n 2, bid 133, 139. 
45 Ibid 128. 
14 
 
Anthropological studies of Bougainvillean society show that there is a shared sense of 
identity – a ‘pan-Bougainville identity’ – among ethnic descendants of the original peoples of 
Bougainville.46 This shared identity has arisen in spite of some enduring cultural and 
linguistic distinctions from sub-region to sub-region.47 And it has also been reinforced by a 
shared sense of having been collectively wronged by colonialism and by forced political 
integration into PNG. However, the danger remains that divisions within this identity bloc 
will surface and crystallise as the possibility of independence nears. This danger will be 
heightened if public debate is allowed to fracture along sub-group lines. Under such 
conditions, ‘[d]ebate leads only to the group position becoming more extreme, as individuals 
only get their prejudices confirmed and strengthened as they talk with like-minded others’.48 
As positions become more extreme, a society becomes more polarised, which in turn erodes 
the society’s sense of shared destiny. It also makes it harder for those on the losing side of a 
referendum to accept the decision as legitimate.  
 
Group Targeting  
 
There is potential for resentment of ‘others’ to surface amid the Bougainville referendum. 
Most especially, non-ethnic Bougainvilleans who have chosen to settle there – notably the 
locally derided ‘redskins’ who migrated from the Highlands of PNG to take work at or 
connected with the mine49 – might be particularly vulnerable to identity-based exclusion, 
                                                     
46 Regan, above n 15, 418 and sources cited therein. 
47 Ibid, 423-424. 
48 Dryzek, ‘Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia’ (2005) 33(2) 
Political Theory 223, 231. 
49  Migrants from the mainland of PNG typically have lighter skin than ethnic Bougainvilleans. This visibility 
leaves them vulnerable where, as in much of Bougainville, they have been collectively typecast as violent and 
anti-social. See, eg, Jill Nash, ‘The red and the black: Bougainvillean perceptions of other Papua New 
Guineans’ (1990) 13 Pacific Studies 1; John Braithwaite, ‘Rape, shame and pride’ (2006) 7 Journal of 
Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 2, 6. 
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discrimination or even violence.50 In conflict societies, popular discourse is often 
characterised more by coercion of opposing groups through violence or threats of violence, 
than by reasoned argument and deliberation. The referendum planning process needs to be 
attentive to multiple possible fracture lines, working consciously towards mutual 
understanding and respect so as to minimise the risk of downstream discord.  
 
Violence and Reaction 
 
The recent history of violence provides much of the context for the upcoming referendum in 
Bougainville. However, violence inspires visceral responses that may cut short good faith 
attempts to engage in deliberation.51 In particular, violent responses to past wrongs, 
perpetrated by citizens who might at other times be open to deliberating, is common in 
conflict societies.52  
 
While, as noted above, weapons disposal is ideally set to occur ahead of the Bougainville 
referendum, it is uncertain whether this process can be completed in time; indeed, progress 
on this has been halting.53 By the Bougainville government’s estimate, weapons disposal 
should be complete by the end of 2018.54 But a number of armed gangs still operating in 
south and central Bougainville, such as the Me’ekamui Defence Force, have previously 
                                                     
50 Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 27-8, estimate that ‘hundreds’ of people from PNG who had married 
Bougainvilleans stayed in Bougainville. Yet, through marriage these people are deemed to be Bougainvilleans 
through cl 7(1)(b) of the Bougainville Constitution. Most non-Bougainvilleans left Bougainville due to the 
conflict; however, it is unclear how many returned.   
51 See, eg, Rajat Ganguly, ‘Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroad between Peace and War’ (2004) 25 
Third World Quarterly 903. 
52 See, eg, Brian Blankenship, ‘When do States Take the Bait? State Capacity and the Provocation Logic of 
Terrorism’ (2016) 43(1) Journal of Conflict Resolution 1. 
53 Anthony Regan, ‘Bougainville: Conflict Deferred?’ in Edward Aspinall, Robin Jeffrey and Anthony Regan 
(eds), Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: Why Some Subside and Others Don’t (Routledge, 2013) 
130. 
54 James Tanis, ‘Bougainville: Planning for a Peaceful Referendum and a Stable Post-Referendum Situation’ 
(Speech delivered at the ANU, Canberra, 31 October 2017). 
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refused to participate in the BPA and weapons disposal and continue to rebuff the ARB 
government’s efforts to engage them.55 They could hold up to 2,500 weapons.56  
Compounding this risk factor are the large numbers of young men with limited or no formal 
education and few economic opportunities, carrying the burdens of displacement and social 
dislocation, who may be easily exploited by these minor warlords and other willing spoilers 
in the lead up to, or aftermath of, a referendum.57 
 
Low Information and Misinformation 
 
Conflict societies are often characterised by information deficits. Conflict may coincide with 
low general rates of education. Information vacuums can in turn be relatively easily filled 
with elite propaganda and oversimplification.58 There is potential for elites in Bougainville 
and PNG to distort the debate around independence to suit their own ends. In the extreme, 
disinformation can involve the control of media outlets in order to silence critics and valorise 
‘desirable’ voices.59  
 
Many schools closed down during the Bougainville crisis.60 It is estimated that up to 50 per-
cent of Bougainvilleans in urban areas have not attended formal schools.61 The literacy rate in 
                                                     
55 Ibid; Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 63; Oren Ipp and Iian Cooper, Bougainville Stability Desk Study, US 
Agency for International Development, Washington DC, 10 October 2013, 14..   
56 Regan, above n 21, 96.  
57  Jo Woodbury, ‘The Bougainville independence referendum: assessing the risks and challenges before, during 
and after the referendum’, Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers series, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 
January 2015, 17. 
58 Mohammed Bakari and Alexander Makulilo, ‘Beyond Polarity in Zanzibar? The ‘Silent’ Referendum and the 
Government of National Unity’ (2012) 30 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 195, 205. 
59 Carolyn Hamilton, ‘Uncertain Citizenship and Public Deliberation in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (2009) 35 
Social Dynamics 355, 359–362. 
60 Bacre Waly N’diaye, Report on the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/4/Add.2 (27 February 1996) para 56. 
61 Brigadier Justin Ellwood, ‘Understanding the Neighbourhood: Bougainville’s Referendum for Independence’ 
(Report, Australian Defence College, 2014) 17; Satish Chand, ‘Building Peace in Bougainville: Measuring 
Recovery Post-Conflict’ (Working Paper, ANU Research Publications, 2013) 3. 
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Bougainville is relatively robust at 79.72 per-cent.62 But gaps in literacy and formal education 
in Bougainville are factors likely to impact on the process of a referendum vote and hence on 
its legitimacy. The Bougainville Audience Study 2017 notes the frequency of ‘expressions 
like “mipela stap long tudak” (“we are in the dark”) and “mipela olsem aipas man” (“we are 
like blind people”)’.63 74 per-cent of respondents indicated they were ‘unsure’ about the 
referendum processes in particular.64 There are evident communication barriers in 
Bougainville with issues regarding access to media platforms in some regions and concerns 
that the government is not effectively communicating information. 
 
The published material produced to inform Bougainvilleans about the referendum and the 
issues it addresses acknowledges the problem of misinformation and misunderstandings. 
Some of the specific confusions that this material sets out to expose and correct include 
beliefs that: Bougainville must prove itself to be economically self-sufficient before the 
referendum can occur; achieving good governance and the elimination of weapons are 
preconditions to a referendum; the BRA and implementing provisions in the PNG 
Constitution will lapse as at June 2020; and a vote for independence will trigger an 
immediate legal entitlement to Bougainville independence which the PNG Government is 
bound to grant.65 The uncovering and rectification of these and other potentially damaging 
misconceptions will be an important element in ensuring the integrity of the referendum 
process and maximising the chances for peaceful transition or continuity (either way, 
settlement) in its aftermath.  
 
                                                     
62 Wallis, above n 14, 281. 
63 Verna Thomas, Catherine Levy, Cynthia Vetunawa and Patrick Rawstorne, ‘Bougainville Audience Study’ 
(Report, University of Goroka, 2017) 32. 
64 Ibid 32. 
65 Bougainville Referendum Communications Committee, Joint Key Messages, No 2 Fact Sheet – June 2016. 
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Lurking behind many of these erroneous beliefs may be vested interests with the potential to 
distort or even derail progress to towards a referendum. Members of the political classes who 
control the official dissemination of information and other procedural aspects of the process 
might be expected to have their own preferences and interests in terms of the spectrum of 
possible referendum outcomes. Some could stand to gain personally, in power and/or wealth, 
from either independence or ongoing membership of the PNG polity. Some may anticipate 
personal or familial gain, aside from wider societal gain, from the return of mining to 
Bougainville, the prospects for which may be tied to the referendum outcome.66 Design of the 
process ought ideally be alive to these probable elite interests and their distorting potential.  
  
Uneven Deliberative Commitments 
 
A related worry is that the members of a conflict society will struggle to view each other as 
reasonable people engaging in reasonable disagreements.67 The crucial point is not that the 
members of such societies are likely to lack the capacity to deliberate; rather, it is that it is 
difficult to create conditions or institutions in which they feel safe to do so.68 
 
Of course, some people – for example, so-called ‘spoilers’69 – may simply refuse to 
deliberate, no matter how propitious the institution. They may do so because they calculate 
that it will serve their interests or, more dramatically, because they are fanatics and hence 
                                                     
66 Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 128.  
67 Rawls, Political Liberalism, above n 9, 54-58. 
68 Cf. John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford University 
Press, 2000) 219. Related, one might be tempted to assume that some people are better at deliberating than 
others, e.g., because they have more years in formal education. See, e.g., Hamilton, above n 59, 359. However, 
this assumption is not clearly supported by the empirical evidence; see, e.g., O’Flynn and Sood, ‘What Would 
Dahl Say? An Appraisal of the Democratic Credentials of Deliberative Polls and Other Mini-Publics’, in 
Kimmo Grönlund, André Bächtiger and Maija Setälä (eds.), Deliberative Mini-Publics: Practices, Promises, 
Pitfalls (ECPR Press, 2014), 46-47. 
69 On ‘spoiler’ problems in peace processes, see Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’ 
(1997) 22(2) International Security 5-53. 
19 
 
impervious to the reasons others put to them, no matter how rationally compelling. In 
Bougainville, as elsewhere, a core of individuals will view deliberation as neither plausible 
nor desirable. The institutional design problem, therefore, becomes how to accommodate 
people who hold markedly different ideas about the sources of legitimacy in collective 
decision-making. 
Also appearing to waver in commitment – not just to a deliberative process but to referendum 
in its entirety – is the current PNG government. PNG’s Prime Minister, Peter O’Neill, has 
opted to defer key meetings with ARB leaders in 2017 and again in 2018, slowing progress 
towards the referendum.70 His government has also been slow to release promised funds to 
support the operations of the JSB, as well as more general restoration funding committed to 
the ARB under the terms of the BPA.71 Without those funds, the ARB is hamstrung in its 
ability to meet the BRA preconditions for a referendum of weapons disposal and restoration 
of stable law and order.  
 
The Prime Minister’s rhetoric in public statements concerning the Bougainville referendum is 
far from accepting and encouraging. While attempting to put down secessionist rumblings in 
other provinces, Prime Minister Peter O’Neill has repeatedly emphasised that the ultimate 
decision on Bougainville’s independence rests with the PNG Parliament and should not be 
considered a direct function of any referendum result.72 He has also made clear that, in 
exercising that ultimate power to decide, PNG will hold Bougainville strictly to its end of the 
bargain as framed in the BPA (ie, weapons disposal and good governance). Addressing the 
                                                     
70  ‘ABC on Joint Supervisory Body deferrals’, Press Release by ARB President Chief Dr John Momis, 23 
November 2017.  
71  Ibid. 
72  See, eg, “Parliament to make final decision in the result of B’ville referendum’, The National, 5 March 2018 
< https://www.thenational.com.pg/parliament-make-final-decision-result-bville-referendum> accessed 25 March 
2018;  ‘Bougainville independence referendum ‘may not be possible’ with key conditions not met: PNG PM’, 
ABC news online, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-27/png-pm-casts-doubt-over-bougainville-
independence-referendum/8990692 accessed 25 March 2018. 
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PNG leaders’ summit in March 2018, O’Neill said that ‘before a referendum [on 
Bougainville’s future] is held, weapons disposal must take place. Nobody has proven to me 
that it has been done. Secondly, is the rule of law well established? Again, there are some 
parts [of the ARB] where the rule of law is non-existent. We all know that.’ In the same 
speech, O’Neill went on to say that ‘we worry about the unity of our country. We can’t have 
every resource-rich province secede from Papua New Guinea.’ Similarly non-committal 
statements have been made in other settings, provoking anger that the national government is 
discussing Bougainville’s future openly with third parties while lacking commitment to 
engaging with Bougainville directly.73 Ultimately, if the people of Bougainville cannot have 
confidence that a referendum will even be held, let along that a vote for independence would 
be respected, this may endanger their commitment to a peaceful process. 
 
Referendums and Deliberation 
 
Finally, referendums raise distinct challenges for deliberation. The impediments canvassed 
thus far show the uncertain prospects of relying on public deliberation to settle conflict. 
Indeed, one might conclude that the prospects for deliberation are even lower in the case of 
referendums. For example, one might assume that the traditional ‘yes’ or ‘no’ structure of the 
ballot must be particularly inimical since it precludes the sort of flexibility or mutual 
responsiveness on which deliberation necessarily depends. If the choice is ‘either/or’, then it 
is, on the face of it, hard to see where people might go from there or what incentive they 
might have to approach the issue with an open mind. 
 
                                                     
73  ‘Leaders condemn O’Neill comments’, PNG Post Courier, 21 March 2018 
<https://postcourier.com.pg/leaders-condemn-oneill-comments/. Accessed 27 March 2018. 
21 
 
Conflict scholars tend to conclude that popular participation – particularly in a referendum – 
only aggravates problems of deliberation; many therefore prefer elite leadership.74 However, 
and importantly, social psychologists have shown that division and polarisation are especially 
acute in decision-making among elites. Highly educated citizens are well equipped to choose 
and bend information to match pre-existing assumptions that align with polarised positions.75 
These ‘motivated reasoners’ are driven to fit new knowledge into existing polarised 
categories.76 This is an important point because it suggests that, by some key criteria, 
deliberation might be better conducted by non-elites. Motivated reasoning by elites frustrates 
deliberative pursuits of overlapping consensus. This modest degree of consensus (i.e., 
consensus about some, but not all, matters) was one of the deliberative qualities noted in our 
introduction to this paper. In general, such consensus is only feasible if deliberators remain 
somewhat flexible in their positions – for example, in their negotiating positions and 
understandings of what is in their own best interests. 
 
High-quality deliberation may, then, be more plausible among non-elite individuals in key 
respects. However, a caveat is that this may be so only when deliberation is robustly 
supported by institutional design. While it is often the case that such individuals lack relevant 
knowledge or deliberative habits, these deficiencies might be partly answered by institutional 
methods.77 As noted, the deliberative referendums literature outlines institutional means for 
improving on the relatively crude voting models of most referendums. Some deliberative 
referendum features have even been trialled to some degree, though mostly in non-conflict 
                                                     
74 See, eg, Arend Lijpahrt, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (2nd 
Ed) (University of California Press, 1975) 111; Brendan O’Leary, ‘Debating Consociational Politics: Normative 
and Explanatory Arguments’ in Sidney John Roderick Noel (ed), From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-
Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (McGill-Queen’s Press, 2005) 10. 
75 Dan M Kahan, ‘Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection’ (2013) 8 Judgment and Decision 
Making 407, 417-18. 
76 Ibid 408. 
77 Janette Hartz-Karp and Michael K Briand, ‘Institutionalising Deliberative Democracy: Theoretical and 
Practical Challenges’ (2009) 24 Australasian Parliamentary Review 167.  
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societies.  
 
Our focus in the next several parts is on whether, in a conflict setting too, a deliberative 
referendum can mitigate the deliberative problems that we have canvassed. In those parts we 
examine more specific design options for the deliberative referendum. We canvass four key 
features and their rationales, in each case relating our general comments to the imminent 
Bougainville referendum. Some features are intended to improve deliberation during the 
referendum campaign as a way of making successful settlement more likely. Additionally, 
some features confer greater legitimacy on the settlement process and thus potentially ensure 
against subsequent breach, after a settlement is reached.78 Supporting deliberation in a 
process of constitutional change may thus have the effect of increasing both the prospects and 
the sustainability of settlement.  
 
Preliminary Generalised Value Voting 
 
A conflict-society deliberative referendum should be constructed as a public-values voting 
exercise. That is, most of the questions voted upon in the referendum, and official 
information disseminated in the referendum campaign, should (to the degree possible) be cast 
in the language of values that are broadly shared. Hence voters should be asked to express 
their opinions about an array of public values arising in the conflict, which are set out clearly 
and pithily on the ballot. Specific detail should not be the main subject of referendum 
deliberation, though what detail there is should be sufficient to stimulate meaningful 
deliberation – and, more especially, deliberation from common ground.  
                                                     
78 Legitimacy is broadly seen as a key determinant of the subsequent durability of peacemaking agreements: see, 
eg, Edward Aspinall, Robin Jeffrey and Anthony Regan, Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: Why 
Some Subside and Others Don’t (Routledge, 2013) 265. 
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In principle, framing deliberation in public-value terms can improve opportunities for 
engaging in public reason and achieving overlapping consensus which, in turn, can be 
essential for conflict settlement. As we noted earlier, public reason requires that participants 
couch their reasons in terms of public values, that is, values that all reasonable people can 
reasonably be expect to endorse. In practice, that will entail couching their claims in the 
(public) language of equality, freedom, inclusion, respect and so forth rather than in the 
(private) language of particular religious, ideological or moral codes (which those who do not 
share those codes are unlikely to accept as reasons for a collective choice). It thus requires 
opponents to give reasons for the claims that are both accessible and acceptable to each 
other.79  
 
To give an example, the 1998 Belfast Agreement80 is sometimes cast as a strategic bargain. In 
this mould, Brendan O’Leary claims that Irish nationalists ‘endorsed it because it promises 
them political, legal, and economic equality now, plus institutions in which they have a 
strong stake, with the possibility of Irish unification later’81, while British unionists endorsed 
it because ‘only by being generous now could they reconcile nationalists to the Union, and 
protect themselves against possibly seismic shifts in the balance of demographic power’.82 
Yet, what analyses of this sort overlook is that the document that ordinary people were asked 
to ratify or legitimise was expressly framed in terms of public values. In particular, the 
‘Declaration of Support’ with which the Agreement begins is couched in the language of 
(inter alia) ‘reconciliation’, ‘tolerance’, ‘mutual trust’, ‘human rights’, ‘partnership’, 
                                                     
79 Rawls, Political Liberalism, above n 9, 132-172.  
80Belfast Agreement, Britain-Northern Ireland-Government of Ireland, signed 10 April 1998, No. 50 (2000) Cm 
4705 (entered into force 2 December 1999).  
81 Brendan O’Leary, ‘The Nature of the Agreement’ (1998) 22(4) Fordham International Law Journal 1655. 
82 Ibid 1656. 
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‘equality’, ‘mutual respect’ and ‘exclusively democratic and peaceful means’.83 Of course, 
one might snort that values of this sort are simply far too general or underspecified to 
seriously guide deliberation. But principles of equality and mutual respect did, in fact, shape 
the concrete details of what was finally agreed. For example, the principle of ‘parity of 
esteem’ is reflected in its dual premiership, communal designation, proportionality rules and 
mutual vetoes.84 
 
Public-values deliberation, therefore, can represent a step away from the parties’ partisan 
positions. It can also avoid the need for difficult social learning about technical details. In the 
Colombian case, for instance, the draft agreement buried broad principles inside 297 pages of 
provisions and implementation details. A public discourse at this level of detail is unrealistic. 
Moreover, a settlement campaign focused too much on institutional specifics can mire the 
referendum in debate over a potentially infinite range of contingent claims and counter-
claims.  
 
Accordingly, the deliberative referendum ballot should ask voters not about their own 
interests, but about what general values, applying to all sides, should drive a final settlement. 
This condition is intended to help voters transcend their own narrow perspectives, and to 
engage instead in broader forms of reasoning conducive to overlapping consensus. The ballot 
should thus present voters with options such as whether ‘all communities should enjoy 
security against violence’ or ‘all communities should enjoy equitable political 
representation’. Generalised propositions of this sort apply to everyone. Voting ‘against’ 
                                                     
83 ‘Belfast Agreement, Britain-Northern Ireland-Government of Ireland, signed 10 April 1998, No. 50 (2000) 
Cm 4705 (entered into force 2 December 1999) Preamble paras 1-6.  
84 Ian O’Flynn, ‘Pulling Together: Shared Intentions, Deliberative Democracy and Deeply Divided Societies’ 
(2017) 47(1) British Journal of Political Science 187, 198. See also Thomas Hennessey, The Northern Ireland 
Peace Process (Gill & Macmillan, 2001) 7-9. On the role of justice in negotiation, see Ira William Zartman, 
Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essay on Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2008). 
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another community would thus require voting against one’s own community. Voting 
machines or online voting should prevent write-in answers and partial responses. Each value 
proposition should be individually endorsed or rejected by a majority vote.  
 
A final proviso is that the referendum ballot should begin with public-value based questions 
such as: ‘rank the following values in order of your preference’. The options should be 
determined by an inclusive, representative mini-public (see below). Only after value 
questions have been posed should the voter then be presented with a menu of general 
institutional options such as ‘full independence’ or ‘state autonomy within a federation’. 
Together these features can encourage purposive deliberation among voters by asking them 
to consider and weigh the competing objectives behind reform proposals before they cast 
votes on specific proposals.  
 
The ballot questions ideally should present an array of options, both for preliminary questions 
about values and for later questions regarding Bougainville’s final political/institutional 
status. By contrast, binary yes/no questions are often ‘divisive and inaccurate’ and should be 
avoided if possible, as they might not reflect the diversity of options that voters favour.85 The 
simplest multi-option approach is to ask voters to choose just one of several preferences 
presented on the ballot. This is compatible with the current plan for ballot counting in 
Bougainville: ballots are to be organised into piles based on the options they endorse, and the 
prevalence of each option will then be counted.86  
 
However, an amended – and slightly more complex – ‘preferential’ system would be ideal for 
                                                     
85 Peter Emerson, Defining Democracy: Voting Procedures in Decision-making, Elections and Governance 
(2011, Springer) 49. 
86 Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville-Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville 
Referendum 2002, Sch.1.103. 
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a multi-option referendum. A preferential ballot asks voters to rank, from highest to lowest, 
their preferences among several options; thus voters could select more than one option in 
order of their preferences. This model would be useful for the final set of questions regarding 
political/institutional options, as under a preferential ‘instant runoff’ system, lowest-ranked 
preferences are progressively eliminated until a single option achieves a majority.87 This can 
give greater perceived legitimacy to the single winning option. It improves on standard 
systems where it is possible that no single option will gain majority support. However, a 
preferential system would require amendments to existing law, and presupposes numeracy 
among voters. 
 
The deliberative referendum might play two other crucial roles. First, in cases where a 
preferential ballot structure is utilised, political elites may have reason to broaden their appeal 
(which, again, would require the use of public reason). Knowing that lower-order preference 
may make a difference to the eventual outcome, they have an incentive to moderate their 
approach.88 Secondly, the deliberative referendum could give impetus to elites (especially 
leaders of parties in conflict) to negotiate and conclude a final agreement. Such elites can use 
the results of specific value-preference questions to constrain and give direction to their 
negotiations. That is, answers to preliminary generalised value questions could subsequently 
guide leaders charged with implementing referendum outcomes by providing them with a 
clear understanding of voters’ value preferences. It would also make it harder for them 
simply to pursue their own partisan or sectional interests. 
                                                     
87 Graeme Orr, ‘Preferenda: the Constitutionality of Multiple Option Referenda’ (2001) 3(4) Constitutional Law 
and Policy Review 68. There is there is no similar benefit from identifying, earlier in the ballot, a single value as 
dominant; in reality multiple values will likely drive voters’ choices. 
88 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, first published 1985, 2001 ed); 
Donald Horowitz, ‘Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers’ (2003) 14 (4), Journal of Democracy 
118-119. Of particular relevance to the case at hand, see Donald Horowitz, ‘Where Have all the Parties Gone? 
Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote—Yet Again’ (2007) 133 (1-2), Public Choice 13-23. 
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Generalised Value Options in the Bougainville Referendum: 
 
The following is an indicative set of values that might be put to voters in Bougainville. To be 
democratically robust, the task of defining the actual set put to voters should fall to a mini-
public. These proposals are thus merely illustrative. They include that ‘all peoples and 
individuals should enjoy’: 
• ‘Security against violence’ 
• ‘A fair share of natural resources’ 
• ‘A right to economic support and development’ and 
• ‘A right to support and protection of distinctive cultures’ 
 
Mini-Publics 
 
A deliberative referendum should be preceded by a mini-public randomly chosen from the 
voting population. A mini-public’s small membership (e.g., 20-200) permits more sustained 
and extensive deliberation than is possible amongst an entire public. Mini-publics learn at 
length from diverse experts before tackling a contentious problem and proposing the content 
to be placed on the referendum ballot (such as the value and institutional options outlined 
above). Amongst their own members, mini-publics prompt better-informed deliberation, 
mutual recognition and learning, preference change and even value change. These 
conclusions have often been empirically confirmed – even in conflict societies such as 
Colombia, Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland.89 For instance, O’Flynn and Caluwaerts 
                                                     
89 Margarita Orozco and Juan Ugarriza, ‘The Citizens, the Politicians and the Courts: A Preliminary Assessment 
of Deliberative Capacity in Colombia’ in Juan Ugarriza and Didier Caluwaerts (eds) Democratic Deliberation in 
Deeply Divided Societies: From Conflict to Common Ground (Palgrave, 2014) 73–88; A Norman, ‘The Use of 
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explain that a focused deliberative setting can ‘foster more positive inter-group attitudes’ 
among participants, including ‘mutual respect and the acknowledgement of the validity of 
others’ claims, indicating that ordinary citizens’ views on divisive issues may be less 
intractably conflicting than expected’.90  
 
One reason why citizens in conflict societies can deliberate effectively in mini-publics may 
be that these institutions generally exclude partisan political elites.91 Mini-publics sideline 
elites who may favour the status quo of conflict. As noted, elites of various kinds are 
relatively able, through specious logic and factual cherry-picking, to deploy arguments that 
reconfirm what they already believe. Moreover, conflict settlements threaten the power 
arrangements of elite political and military leaders. Often elite figures’ careers, ideologies 
and identities are tied to the struggle with the ‘other side’. At the same time, elite leaders are 
often insulated from the violent consequences of conflict. Non-elite citizens may lack their 
leaders’ intensity of in-group feeling, and be better able to reconsider their own positions, and 
more eager to see an end to the struggle and its attendant disruptions. Mini-publics also tend 
to be more widely trusted than other forms of representation. There is evidence that mini-
publics can inform both the substance and the style of public deliberation in the broader 
referendum campaign,92 though such evidence is still lacking in conflict societies.  
 
                                                     
the Group and Group Work Techniques in Resolving Interethnic Conflict’ (1992) 14(3/4) Social Work with 
Groups 175; M Lydia Khuri, ‘Facilitating Arab-Jewish Intergroup Dialogue in the College Setting’ (2004) 7(3) 
Race, Ethnicity and Education 229, 244; Robert Luskin, Ian O’Flynn, James Fishkin and David Russell, 
‘Deliberating across Deep Divides’ (2014) 62(1) Political Studies 116. 
90 Ian O’Flynn and Didier Caluwaerts, ‘Deliberation in Deeply Divided Societies’ in André Bächtiger, John 
Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge and Mark Warren (eds), Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy (Oxford 
University Press, 2018 forthcoming). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Fred Cutler, Richard Johnston, R Kenneth Carty, André Blais and Patrick Fournier, ‘Deliberation, 
Information and Trust: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly as Agenda-Setter’ in Mark E Warren and 
Hilary Pearse (eds), Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge 
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29 
 
Mini-Public in the Bougainville Referendum Campaign: 
 
A mini-public’s ‘bottom-up’ approach has the potential to catalyse deliberation and enable 
the Bougainville community to take ‘ownership of the process’.93 For instance, one 
Bougainville Audience Study respondent said ‘all ideas must start from inside the community 
and go upwards’.94 The Study also noted feelings of ‘powerlessness’ and vulnerability in the 
communities, with respondents expressing ‘little faith in the government’s approach’.95 This 
may further reinforce the need for a mini-public in Bougainville.  
 
A Bougainville mini-public should have members randomly selected yet stratified 
demographically in at least the following ways: 
• Equal numbers from each tribal, ethnic or linguistic group – including non-ethnic-
Bougainvilleans, 
• Equal numbers of male and female members, 
• Equal numbers from various age groups, 
• A majority drawn from populations with low (including lowest-quintile) 
socioeconomic status,  
• Some former combatants (but not so many as to constitute a dominant bloc), and 
• No members holding ‘elite’ positions or status (ie, those holding elected, hereditary, 
spiritual or other recognised authority to make decisions on behalf of substantial 
numbers of people). 
 
A mini-public does not deliberately select participants who have diverse points of view, but 
                                                     
93 Thomas et al, above n 63, 39; Regan et al, above n 2121, 53; Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 119. 
94 Thomas et al, above n 63, 40. 
95 Ibid 39. 
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incidentally tends to include many points of view due to its demographic diversity (usually 
via some form of random sampling). Equal rather than proportionate representation of tribal, 
ethnic, age and linguistic groups particularly aims to ensure that mini-public deliberations do 
not merely reflect dominant opinions in the broader society, but instead air and consider both 
dominant and minority points of view. An ideal mini-public or other deliberative democratic 
process places these views on equal footing in order to consider them on the basis of merit, 
rather than in proportion to their support among the population. Hence, the stipulation that 
most members should be drawn from low socioeconomic status populations reflects the need 
to counter the political dominance of high-socioeconomic status individuals by ensuring that 
they have a sufficient ‘critical mass’ to get their points across.96 Young people, too, are 
excluded from many traditional decision-making processes. 
 
A similar concern drives the stipulation for equal numbers of men and women, especially 
since this feature encounters complex and changing gender dynamics in Bougainville. There 
is a concern that women may not feel comfortable expressing their opinions in a mini-public. 
The Bougainville Audience Study 2017 suggests that women feel more comfortable raising 
their concerns in women’s groups or through their church network.97 Men now dominate the 
political debate and in some instances traditional matrilineal structures have been 
‘disregarded’.98 For example, in the 2005 Bougainville election three women and thirty-eight 
men were elected; these three seats were specifically reserved for women.99 Regan indicates 
that while women were involved with peace-making process in Bougainville, their role was 
                                                     
96 It is commonly assumed that people from disadvantaged backgrounds are less capable of deliberating (e.g., 
that they are likely to speak less) than those who are not. Yet, while the evidence does not support this 
assumption, ‘[r]andom assignment to small groups generally produces a fair amount of ‘variation in variation’ – 
some groups are more internally diverse than others. So, while certain minorities are well represented in some 
small groups, they are not well represented in others. Consequently, in some cases they may lack the ‘critical 
mass’ and hence the confidence to voice their own concerns’: O’Flynn and Sood, above n 68, 47. 
97 Ibid 48. 
98 Ibid 48. See also Regan, above n 21, 11.  
99 Braithwaite et al, above n 5, 120.  
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considered complete ‘once the violence had ended’.100 Despite this, Regan suggests women 
in Bougainville are challenging male-dominated politics.101  
 
The ban on elites participating within the mini-public is a particularly important proviso, 
which reflects one of the essential rationales for mini-publics previously discussed. 
(However, elite experts, such as economists or medics, and discussion group facilitators are 
necessary; these should be chosen for their ability and neutrality.) Eliminating elite roles and 
limiting high-socioeconomic status members (though, again, only insofar as this is necessary 
to ensure that all points of view receive a fair hearing) also may widen perceptions among 
non-members of the mini-public’s legitimacy. It also might exclude elite motivated-reasoners 
who, as already noted, frequently oppose open and flexible deliberative processes.  
 
A potential critique is that Bougainvilleans are significantly influenced by powerful men 
(and, at least historically, women), such that a wholly non-elite process could be culturally 
unsuitable. However, an entirely non-elite peacemaking process is in any event not possible 
or necessary. Elites must be reintroduced at the final stages, after the mini-public’s 
conclusion, to conduct detailed negotiations. Moreover, note than many leaders may 
welcome the advice and assistance, as well as the popular legitimacy, deriving from a 
significantly non-elite process such as a mini-public.102 In practice, as with all mini-publics, 
formal or tacit approval by elites for running the process will be crucial in Bougainville if the 
body is to run smoothly and achieve influence. Relevant elites might include 
parliamentarians, local chiefs, veteran leaders of the armed conflict (some particularly 
respected as ‘liberators’) and the Council of Elders (traditional leadership groups that assist 
                                                     
100 Regan, above n 21, 41. 
101 Despite this, Regan suggests women in Bougainville are challenging male-dominated politics: Ibid. 
102 We are grateful to Bal Kama for this insight. 
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the government).103  
  
Preliminary Instruction 
 
Beyond mini-publics, additional deliberative referendum design features might also influence 
the quality of deliberation in the referendum campaign. Referendum campaigns involve 
inevitably wider and more chaotic deliberation than that of mini-publics alone. Yet, in 
comparison with many other forms of popular debate, referendum campaigns are time-
constrained and substantively limited to just a handful of topics. This may help to make them 
more amenable to the targeted provision of information to enhance deliberation and protect 
against the machinations of vested interests. Preliminary instruction can involve voting 
(either online or at voting stations) that requires the voter first to engage with an interactive 
informational tutorial.104 To promote balance and neutrality, the noted mini-public would 
design the tutorial materials.  
 
Preliminary Instruction in the Bougainville Referendum: 
 
Illiteracy and the marked pluralism of language and dialect groups in Bougainville pose 
challenges for standard models of preliminary instruction. Information cannot be in purely 
                                                     
103 Ellwood, above n 61, 7. Note as well that, as mentioned above, a Constituent Assembly – in some ways 
comparable to a mini-public – ran in 2004. By many accounts the Assembly was an effective body. However, 
there remains a need for a mini-public. This is firstly because distinctive decisions (e.g., ballot design) are 
required of the prospective mini-public. Secondly, and more fundamentally, relying on mini-publics to bring 
greater deliberation and legitimacy to a referendum generally requires that the mini-public run just prior to the 
referendum. Most citizens will otherwise be unaware of institutional processes that ran years earlier. For 
instance, following the celebrated mini-public on electoral reform held in British Columbia 2004, the body 
helped to improve deliberation and persuade voters in a referendum held that year. However, another 
referendum five years later enjoyed a less deliberatively robust discourse and a far more negative substantive 
outcome. A key factor was that the province did not convene a new mini-public prior to the 2009 referendum: 
Graham Smith, Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 72-73. 
104 Levy, above n 12. 
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textual form, but must also be aural and visual. The mini-public should be tasked with 
producing clear information, covering a range of arguments about the pros and cons of 
independence in Bougainville, and doing so in both Tok Pisin and a variety of languages.105 
Expert facilitation could aid the mini-public in presenting such information in a compelling 
audio-visual format. This recorded tutorial could last approximately fifteen minutes – neither 
too brief nor too lengthy, in recognition that not all voters have time or inclination to engage 
in a more involved process. 
 
The technological challenges raised by these requirements are significant. Bougainville lacks 
highly developed technological infrastructure. As in a number of developing regions globally, 
mobile phone coverage in Bougainville is generally more extensive than road coverage. 
Mobile phones have thus become key platforms for communication (including by social 
media) and even economic transactions. (Considerable popular trust in the technology’s 
security is required for the latter.) Phones can similarly be relied upon as platforms for 
preliminary instruction. This could involve text messaging, which at current count is 
available to 3 in 4 Bougainvilleans.106 However, text messaging is a limited and inflexible 
format. Radio broadcasting is an alternative. Yet, though widely trusted, radio is not spread 
across all regions.107 
 
Most useful would be a web-based interactive video. This would be difficult to support, 
given the internet’s relatively low local availability – currently 27 per-cent, as most phones 
                                                     
105 On the face of it, one might object that the members of the mini-public will also struggle to communicate 
with one another. However, evidence from mini-publics suggests that the quality of deliberation may actually be 
higher in linguistically mixed groups than in linguistically homogeneous groups: Didier Caluwaerts and Kris 
Deschouwer, ‘Building Bridges Across Political Divides: Experiments on Deliberative Democracy in Deeply 
Divided Belgium’ (2014) 6(3) European Political Science Review 427-450. 
106 Thomas et al, above n 63, 11. 
107 Ibid 20. 
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are 2G with no internet access – and high costs.108 These statistics raise clear ‘digital divide’ 
concerns: that internet communication will benefit only the relatively wealthy. However, and 
importantly, access fees could be selectively waived on given days or for particular websites 
– a modest cost that foreign governments might wish to bear. And a more onerous foreign 
contribution (albeit one useful for the long term) could be to install mobile phone towers and 
signal amplifying ‘repeaters’. Australia has historically made similar infrastructure 
contributions.109 Ultimately, lower-tech approaches also are likely to be necessary. Churches 
and schools in Bougainville could disseminate information, either in the form of interactive 
videos viewable on-site, or in more traditional forms (e.g., pamphlets, and speeches given by 
mini-public participants). 
 
Popular Legitimacy 
 
The deliberative referendum design features outlined above use institutional design to 
improve the deliberative capacities of ordinary people for the duration of the referendum 
campaign and vote. There is no expectation in the short term that a deliberative referendum 
will eliminate all of the causes of conflict. However, it may lend any resulting agreement 
legitimacy and assist the agreement to endure. Hence the referendum can both stabilise an 
agreement and help to avoid backsliding later on.110  
 
According to Tierney, ‘the referendum can take on moral force’ – more than a declaration by 
                                                     
108 Ibid 11. 
109 In 1999, AusAID contributed to the upgrade of facilities for Radio Bougainville: Commonwealth, 
Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade, Parl Paper No 193 (1999) app L. 
110 John M Carey, ‘Does It Matter How a Constitution is Created?’ in Zoltan Barany and Robert G Moser (eds), 
Is Democracy Exportable? (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 172. 
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an elected legislature ever could.111 Referendums can establish the ceremony and solemnity 
befitting an enduring constitutional settlement. They may signal that norms emerging from 
the process should be viewed as foundational and enduring. Just as importantly, as noted 
above, citizens who find themselves on the losing side of a deliberative referendum vote may 
be more likely to accept the outcomes as legitimate insofar as they see it as emerging from a 
process that is impartial, fair and democratic.112 More specifically, public-values voting 
should enable them to see why the outcome amounts to more than an exercise in naked 
power, even as they continue to disagree with it. Social backlash or outright reversal are less 
likely under such conditions.113  
 
A deliberative referendum therefore potentially helps to answer the problem noted above of 
uneven commitments to deliberation. As an institution with robust democratic (majority rule) 
and deliberative (free and open exchange of reasons) features,114 its legitimacy could be 
agreed to by a wide cross-section of people, including both those who value majoritarian 
process and those who value deliberation. A decision-making model such as this, which 
robustly adopts both democratic and deliberative features, can perhaps attract the broadest 
perceptions of legitimacy – and in turn underpin a more enduring settlement.  
 
A related issue is the thresholds that should be set for a referendum proposal to be considered 
                                                     
111 Stephen Tierney, ‘Sovereignty and Crimea: How Referendum Democracy Complicates Constituent Power in 
Multinational Societies’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 523, 529, 536. 
112 Philip Pettit, ‘Republican Theory and Political Trust’ in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds), Trust 
and Governance (Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) 296-99; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: 
Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 23–
24. 
113 This is, admittedly, an empirical claim. Yet while it has not, to the best of our knowledge been systemically 
tested, it pervades the literature on deliberative democracy. E.g., Bernard Manin, ‘On Legitimacy and Political 
Deliberation’ (1987) 15(3) Political Theory 338-368. 
114 The two are not wholly distinct: ‘deliberation reinforces democracy, and democracy in turn reinforces 
deliberation’; e.g., better informed voters can express more sincere preferences in a referendum, based on a 
more genuine knowledge of the subject: Ron Levy and Graeme Orr, The Law of Deliberative Democracy 
(Routledge, 2016) 26-27, 50. 
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to be passed. A simple 50 per-cent plus one vote standard has the downside that in a close 
result (e.g., Brexit’s 51.9 per-cent ‘yes’, and the bare majority 50.6 per-cent ‘no’ in Quebec’s 
1995 secession referendum) the winning option may be in doubt. For instance, at these close 
margins any voting irregularities, and the vagaries of turn-out (e.g., fewer than half of eligible 
voters participating), can encourage the view that the vote was illegitimate. Perhaps it was 
not accurately indicative of popular will or, if indicative, reflected only fleeting popular 
preference, which is not itself sufficient to legitimate a long-term constitutional reform. Some 
referendum designers respond to this problem with supermajority requirements (e.g., 55 or 60 
per-cent to pass). A related approach would be to require, as a prerequisite for constitutional 
change, that at least 50 per-cent of all eligible voters vote ‘yes’; in practice, in terms of actual 
votes cast, this would almost always amount to a supermajority requirement.115  
 
Supermajority methods raise their own problems for democratic legitimacy, as a clear 
majority of voters might be denied their preferred option by a supermajority set arbitrarily 
high. (The British Columbian electoral reform of 2004 provides an example; the vote 
achieved 57.7 per-cent support, but fell short of the high 60 per-cent threshold.) A more 
palatable approach is one we call a ‘timed double-majority’. This approach requires a second 
referendum vote to be held within one year of the first vote, if and only if the first vote falls 
short of a clear majority (e.g., the result is between 50.0 plus one vote, and 52.9 per-cent).116 
In addition, there should be a ‘voter quorum’ set at 50 per-cent turn out among eligible 
voters.117 This guarantees that wide-reaching constitutional change cannot take place if fewer 
                                                     
115  
116 Other options include the approach in Canada, where federal legislation requires a clear majority on a clear 
question in any future secession referendum: An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference (aka Clarity Act) S.C. 2000, c. 26. 
However, this option would raise serious risks in conflict areas, given (ironically) the vagueness as to what 
counts as ‘clear’, and about who should be empowered to decide the matter. 
117 Zoltán Tibor Pállinger, Bruno Kaufmann, Wilfried Marxer and Theo Schiller (eds), Direct Democracy in 
Europe: Developments and Prospects (Springer, 2007). 
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than a majority of eligible voters participate in the referendum. On the other hand, it does not 
simply privilege the status quo. 
 
Democratic Design in Bougainville:  
 
In addition to the deliberative institutions and supports canvassed thus far, the referendum 
should ensure best practices in democratic design. This should firstly include the timed 
double majority and 50 per-cent voter quorum requirements just outlined. In addition, the 
referendum should have standard democratic guarantees set out in law, such as: 
• universal adult franchise, 
• anonymous balloting, 
• fair access to public airwaves and other modes of publicity and discussion, and 
• legal safeguards against partisan criminal prosecution.  
Such provisions can reduce the capacity of self-interested political elites and partisan factions 
to capture a referendum for their own purposes, particularly by ‘playing the ethnic card’.118 It 
is partly for this reason that public-values referendum deliberation might be characterised as 
having a circuit-breaking function. As we noted in Part II, the colonial experience in 
Bougainville left a legacy of distrust in governmental elites – including foreign elites. While 
international agents (e.g., NGOs, UN bodies and neutral foreign governments119) might be 
more impartial, popular legitimacy considerations and distrust of elites of various 
                                                     
118 In the ethnic conflict literature, this phenomenon is usually discussed under the heading of ‘outbidding’. See, 
e.g., Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger MacGinty, ‘Ethnic Outbidding and Party Modernization: Understanding 
the Democratic Unionist Party’s Electoral Success in the Post-Agreement Environment’ (2008) 7 (1), 
Ethnopolitics 43–61; Gavin Moore, Neophytos Loizides, Nukhet Sandal and Alexandros Lordos ’Winning 
Peace Frames: Intra-Ethnic Outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus’ (2014) 37 (1), West 
European Politics 159-181 
119  Note that the Melanesian Spearhead Group, a regional intergovernmental organization, would likely not 
qualify as ‘neutral’ for this purpose given that PNG is one of the five member states and PNG Prime Minister 
Peter O’Neill recently assumed the role of Chair. 
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descriptions help to explain the modern popularity of referendums in conflict societies. Elites 
cannot be sidelined; nor, as we noted earlier, should they be. But, if properly conducted, 
referendums can change the incentive structure of elites in ways that are settlement 
supporting.120 Deliberative democracy, particularly its public reason variety, can guide the 
way. 
 
Popular perceptions of the legitimacy of a decision-making process are not dependent only on 
the majoritarian democratic bona fides of the process. Robust deliberation also importantly 
contributes to these perceptions. Evidence suggests that public trust in referendums depends 
partly on deliberative supports to mitigate ordinary citizens’ deliberative weaknesses.121 That 
is, as noted in part II, non-elites tasked with deciding complex problems may encounter 
informational and other difficulties. A process that is not merely democratic, but deliberative 
democratic, is especially likely to attract public trust (a useful marker for perceptions of 
legitimacy). A deliberative referendum therefore potentially helps to answer the problem 
noted above of uneven commitments to deliberation. As an institution with robust democratic 
and deliberative features,122 its legitimacy could be agreed to by a wide cross-section of 
people, including those who value majoritarian process and those who value deliberation. A 
decision-making model such as this, which robustly adopts both democratic and deliberative 
features, can perhaps attract the broadest perception of legitimacy – and in turn a more 
enduring settlement.  
 
                                                     
120 See Jon Elster, ‘Deliberation and Constitution Making’, in Jon Elster (ed), Deliberative Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, 1988) 100-105. 
121 Ron Levy, ‘Breaking the Constitutional Deadlock: Lessons from Deliberative Experiments in Constitutional 
Change’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 805, 834-837. 
122 The two are not wholly distinct: ‘deliberation reinforces democracy, and democracy in turn reinforces 
deliberation’; eg, better informed voters can express more sincere preferences in a referendum, based on a more 
genuine knowledge of the subject: Ron Levy and Graeme Orr, The Law of Deliberative Democracy (Routledge, 
2016) 26-27, 50. 
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A final consideration is when to hold the referendum. As noted, the deliberative referendum 
we propose should run prior to elite-led negotiations on a final settlement. This means, 
formally, the vote must be a non-binding plebiscite, since leeway must be given to elites to 
finalise settlement details. This is consistent with the planned approach for the Bougainville 
referendum, which is intended to be non-binding. Section 342 of the PNG constitution 
provides that the referendum’s results will be subject to consultations later on between the 
two governments. While the referendum campaign is running, and until voting results are 
revealed, elites should nevertheless be largely sidelined.123  
 
When settlement negotiations run in advance of a referendum and are presented to voters for 
endorsement post-hoc, the result can be disappointing. As in Colombia, the pre-negotiated 
settlement may not attract widespread popular support; voters may hesitate to defer to elite 
experts about a complex settlement.124 Non-elites may not understand nor defer to the 
complex compromises negotiated by elites. By contrast, running a prior referendum in which 
non-elite opinions take precedence can allow the vote to influence the more detailed 
negotiations held later on. Negotiating elites will be able (indeed, if the process is properly 
conducted, may be morally obliged) to draw upon the results of the public value-voting 
portion of the ballot to guide their interactions (or, at the very least, to explain in public-value 
terms why they did not do so). Broader engagement, especially at an early stage, may help to 
increase popular, long-term support for settlement.125 Of course the risk is that voters will 
view the legitimacy of the process as undermined if elites retain the final word on settlement 
details. However, running an initial referendum may allow it to proceed without becoming 
                                                     
123 Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 249-252. See similarly, in a non-conflict setting, John Parkinson, ‘Ideas of Constitutions 
and Deliberative Democracy and How They Interact’ in Ron Levy, Hoi Kong, Graeme Orr and Jeff King (eds), 
The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2018).  
124 Levy, above n 121, 807; Tierney, above n 123, 247.  
125 Tierney, above n 123, 251-252. 
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bogged down in technical details, and may also help to impel elites to reach a settlement: 
there are political downsides to rejecting the express, considered preferences of constituents.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The conflict-society deliberative referendum should be understood as minimalist in its aims: 
it does not require wholesale changes to individual value commitments. The referendum is a 
discrete moment in time focused on a specific set of matters. The challenge of popular 
deliberation in a referendum is in this sense relatively modest. There need be no requirement, 
in the first instance, to mend deep social differences. Neither is there a need for individuals to 
move closer to each other in identity or to be more willing to deliberate as a general rule. The 
aim should be instead for a focused airing, generalisation and liberalisation of commonly 
held public values. Deliberative referendums are not intended to be ‘schools for democracy’, 
but of course there is nothing to preclude such an outcome either. 
 
Approached in this way, the referendum in Bougainville may avoid merely aggravating 
conflict, as in past cases, and may be more likely to mitigate it. A deliberative referendum 
aims first to scaffold a tenuous agreement – a circumscribed opportunity to deliberate from 
common ground – and thereafter to concretise the settlement by way of a legitimising 
deliberative referendum – a circumscribed opportunity to case an informed vote. Of course, 
the standard caveat applies: nothing can guarantee successful settlement in practice. Yet 
current approaches to conflict society referendums have often been often markedly 
ineffective – even counterproductive – in part due to their habitual neglect of deliberative 
design. 
 
